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Abstract
This paper explores the decentralized licensing of complementary patents
reading on a technology standard. We develop a model in which manufacturers
must buy licenses from di¤erent patent owners in order to enter the market for
di¤erentiated standard-compliant products. We consider three di¤erent types of
licensing, namely, the xed-fee, per-unit royalty and two-part tari¤ regimes, and
compare their performances in terms of licensing revenue, price, product variety
and welfare. We show that each regime entails di¤erent types of coordination
failures. We establish that each of them may maximize the licensing revenue
depending on the number of licensors, number of potential entrants and product
di¤erentiation.
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1 Introduction
Cooperative technology standards frequently embody complementary patents
belonging to various owners. Over the last two decades, the number of such
patents has increased steeply (Bekkers et al., 2002; Simcoe, 2005), thereby rais-
ing a royalty stacking problem, also known as a "double marginalization" or the
"Cournot-Shapiro" issue. Each patent owner enjoys a monopoly position and
can therefore charge its licensees high royalties. However, patent owners who
do this fail to take into account that they also reduce the demand for licenses
on other complementary patents. The resulting royalty stacking induces not
only a decrease in demand for standard-compliant technologies, but also lower
prots for the patent owners themselves. It would be more protable for the
patent owners to form a "patent pool" by which they can grant a single package
license for the bundle of their patents, and share the resulting licensing revenue
(Shapiro, 2001).
In this paper, we explore whether the coordination failure featuring the
"Cournot-Shapiro" issue may apply to licenses based on schemes other than
royalty. In practise, patent owners may use alternative schemessuch as xed-
fee or, more frequently, a combination of xed-fee and royalty (two-part tari¤)
to license patents reading on standards.3 We analyze each of these schemes in
3Contracts used to license patents relating to standards are seldom publicized. Yet state-
ments by Qualcomm and Interdigital, two major patent owners in wireless communication
standards, highlight the variety of licensing contracts. "We derive the majority of our rev-
enue from patent licensing. ::: These agreements can include, without limitation ::: up-front
and non-refundable license fees and/or ::: licensing royalties on covered products sold by li-
censees" (Interdigital Annual Report, 2009). "In the wireless industry, both handset makers
and chipmakers commonly pay licensing fees in the form of an up-front license fee and a run-
ning royalty that is a percentage of the selling price of the product sold, or some combination
2
turn, to highlight possible coordination failures when numerous complementary
patents are licensed in a decentralized fashion. We compare them as a second
step in identifying which one is more e¢ cient from joint-prot and social welfare
perspectives. Using the best licensing scheme is an interesting alternative to
patent pools since the latter frequently fail to form in practice.4 Our results
suggest especially that the notion of "reasonable" licensing5 should be associated
with particular schemes depending on the number of patents owners and the
structure of the market for standard-compliant goods.
To carry out the analysis, we develop a model in which   1 owners of com-
plementary patents reading on a new standard sell their licenses to manufactur-
ers of standard-compliant products. Manufacturers must buy a license on each
patent before starting production. Consistent with the "non-discriminatory"
licensing requirements usually imposed on patents reading on standards, we
assume that patent owners must grant a license to each manufacturer who is
willing to pay on the same terms as the other licensees.
While the "Cournot-Shapiro" issue has so far been characterized in the case
of homogenous products (Shapiro, 2001), we allow for horizontal di¤erentiation
in the product market. This assumption better captures the type of products
complying with standards in information technologies.6 . Moreover, it has im-
of the two." (Brief of Qualcomm Inc. As Amicus Curiae in Support of Respondent, December
10, 2007)
4Patent owners have strong incentives to stay out of a pool in order to ride freely on the
low price of the package license by charging a higher price for their own patents (Aoki &
Nagaoka, 2004).
5The intellectual property policies of most standard-setting organizations require that
patent owners license their patents under fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory terms (Lem-
ley, 2002).
6Horizontal di¤erentiation is key in markets for video and music contents, covered by
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portant implications with respect to the licensing regimes.
Indeed, we show that the royalty and xed-fee regimes are more or less
appealing for licensors depending on the degree of product di¤erentiation. A
xed-fee regime imposes an entry cost to manufacturers and is therefore a way
for patent owners to control the number of licensees and to extract all possible
prots. By contrast, patent owners cannot use per-unit royalties to control
entry, or to extract all prots. Yet royalties increase marginal manufacturing
costs, and therefore allow patent owners to monitor market prices for a given
number of manufacturers.
If there is only one patent owner, charging a high xed fee is a way to
allow one licensee only and thus to reap the monopoly prot when products
are homogenous. As products get more di¤erentiated, however, it becomes
more protable to use royalties. A larger number of manufacturers can then
enter the market, price competition being mitigated by per-unit royalties. Not
surprisingly, we nd that a single licensor will always prefer the two-part tari¤ to
the xed-fee or royalty regime alone, since it combines the best of both worlds.
Our main nding is that introducing additional patent owners (e.g.  >
1) in this setting can generate some coordination failures with each type of
licensing regime. As a general rule, total licensing revenue is non-increasing
in , irrespective of the licensing scheme. Although xed-fee payments do not
distort competitive prices, their stacking has a negative entry deterrence e¤ect.
In turn, the two-part tari¤ regime combines coordination failures pertaining to
standards such as MPEG, DVD, or BlueRay. The same is true for mobile phones (GSM,
EDGE, or 3G standards), although then vertical di¤erentiation may also play a role.
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both royalty and xed-fee stacking.
Comparing the three regimes with  > 1, we nd that each type of license
may maximize total licensing revenue depending on the degree of product dif-
ferentiation. Fixed-fees only and two-part tari¤ are more protable respectively
for weakly and strongly di¤erentiated products. We show that pure royalties
dominate both xed-fee and two-part tari¤ regimes for intermediate levels of
di¤erentiation. These ndings are consistent with available evidence: patent
owners rely on the pure royalty or two-part tari¤ regimes to reach a large num-
ber of di¤erentiated licensees.7
These results are new in the literature on the licensing of complementary
patents. The coordination failure resulting from the decentralized licensing of
complementary patents has been pinpointed by Shapiro (2001) in the case of
royalty-based licenses only, and discussed further in papers on patent pools
(Lerner & Tirole, 2004; Lerner et al., 2005; Aoki & Nagaoka, 2004). Yet to our
knowledge, potential coordination failures with other licensing schemes have not
been explored, although they may have useful implications in terms of selection
of license. Our approach also relates to the literature on optimal licensing.
Many papers (see Sen (2005) for a good review) compare auctions, royalty
and xed-fee licenses in the trail of the seminal contribution of Kamien and
Tauman (1986, 1992), who found the xed fee to be superior. There papers
usually rely on the distinction between drastic and non-drastic cost-reducing
7Since bilateral licensing contracts are usually kept secret, we rely for evidence on the
licenses publicized by some patent pools. These pools involve a subgroup of the patent owners.
All of them have opted for either pure royalty (DVD6C, and MPEG-LA patent pools) or two-
part tari¤ (Blue-Ray encryption standard).
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innovations, which may be licensed either by a single external patentee (Kamien
and Tauman, 1986, 1992, Muto, 1993, Poddar & Sinha, 2004, Erutku & Richelle,
2007) or by competitors (Wang, 1998, Poddar & Sinha, 2004, Erkal, 2005).
We in turn consider the licensing by several external patentees of a standard
embodying complementary innovations. Since the standard opens a new market
for licensees, it does not match the denition of non-drastic and drastic cost-
reducing innovations, although in e¤ect it is closer to the latter. Muto (1993)
and Poddar and Sinha (2004) show that an external patentee may prefer a
royalty regime when products are di¤erentiated, in Bertrand and linear city
competition settings. We extend this result to di¤erentiation in a Cournot
model, with one or more complementary patents8 . Erutku and Richelle (2007)
introduce the two-part tari¤ in a model derived from Kamien and Tauman
(1986) and show that it always dominates the other schemes. Our analysis
conrms their result, but highlights its limitation when several licensors are
involved.
This article is organized in six sections. Section 2 introduces the model.
In section 3 we solve the licensing equilibria for each type of licensing scheme,
and highlight di¤erent coordination failures when there is more than one patent
owner. We then compare the three licensing schemes in the next two sections,
with regard to licensing revenue (section 4) and social value of the standard
(section 5). Section 6 concludes.
8Caballero-Sanz et al. (2002) also consider a model of optimal licensing with product
di¤erentiation and a single licensor.
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2 The model
In this section, we introduce our general model. We consider a market for
products compliant with a technology standard. The standard incorporates
 patented technologies belonging to  independent owners. The  patents
are essential, so that each manufacturer of a standard-compliant product must
license all patents to enter the product market. Patent owners are not involved
in product manufacturing, and simply seek to maximize their prots through
licensing.
To enter the market, manufacturers of standard-compliant products must
buy a license on each patent. We assume that n (n 2 N and n  1) symmetric
rms are capable of using the standard to produce di¤erentiated outputs, k of
which will eventually enter the market. We consider that there is imperfect
competition on the product market and assume that manufacturers compete à
la Cournot. The total cost function for each producer is linear and such that
TC(q) = cq.
The demand for these products comes from a representative consumer who
has rational preferences characterized by the following utility function:
U (q1; :::; qk) = a
P
i=1;:::;k
qi   1
2
P
i=1;:::k
2664(qi)2 + qi
0BB@ X
j=1;:::k
j 6=i
qj
1CCA
3775 ; (1)
where a > c is a constant and  2 [0; 1] measures product substitutability.
Maximizing the utility subject to budget constraint allows us to determine the
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demand for product i when k products are available. It is given by:
pi(qi; Q i) = a  qi   Q i;
where i = 1; :::; k and Q i =
P
j 6=i
qj .
We consider three possible licensing regimes: xed-fee only, royalty only or
two-part tari¤. The timing is the following. First the patent holder announces
the patent policy stating the xed fee l  0 and royalty r  0. By denition
the xed-fee regime has r = 0, the royalty regime has l = 0 while two-part tari¤
has r > 0 and l > 0. Second, the rms decide whether to buy the licence. We
consider that they derive 0 prot without a license. When l > 0 we consider
that entry is determined by a 0 prot condition since prots are decreasing in
the number of rms. We let 1  k  n denote the number of rms who purchase
the licenses. Third, if k > 1, the rms compete à la Cournot, and if k = 1 the
rm sets its monopoly price and quantity.
Although the number k of licensees is by denition an integer, we study it
as a real number throughout the rest of this paper. However, we consider that
k must be at least equal to 1 for the patent owners to make any prots and
that k  n. By considering any k 2 [1; n] we skip the comparison of the closest
upper and lower integer bounds of k, which simplies the analysis.
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2.1 Output, price and prots
We search for a sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium and solve the game back-
wards. Let L =
P
s=1;:::; ls and R =
P
s=1;:::; rs. The xed-fee L is a cost
paid up front. It a¤ects the Cournot outcome by determining the number of
licensees k who compete. Let (k;R) denote the Cournot prot when k rms
compete and the royalties amount to R  0. Since @
@k
< 0 for any L > 0 there
is a unique k such that
(k; R)  L = 0: (2)
In a free entry equilibrium k rms purchase the license where k = min fk; ng.
Each rm then solves
max
qi
[a  qi   Q i] qi   (c+R) qi;
where Q i =
X
j=1;:::;k
j 6=i
qj:
Observe that the parameter , denoting product di¤erentiation, confers a local
market power to each rm. The unique symmetric equilibrium is such that
q(k;R) =
8>><>>:

a  c R
2 + (k   1)

if R < a  c;
0 otherwise.
(3)
The resulting symmetric price, provided there is production, is such that
p(k;R)  (c+R) = q(k;R):
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Observe that the output per rm and the margin per unit of output are in-
creasing in the degree of product di¤erentiation 1=. Therefore the equilibrium
prot is also increasing with product di¤erentiation:
(k;R) =
8>><>>:

a  c R
2 + (k   1)
2
if R < a  c;
0 otherwise.
(4)
3 Licensing strategies at equilibrium
The separate licensing of complementary innovations has been studied thus far
only in the case of royalty-based licenses. We solve this case in this section
and extend the analysis to licenses based on a xed-fee scheme and on two-
part tari¤. We characterize the prot maximizing licensing contract for each of
the three di¤erent regimes. To identify the possible coordination failures, we
analyze in each case how the total licensing revenue varies with the number of
patent owners.
3.1 Royalty regime
Let (kR; rR1 ; :::; r
R
 ) denote the prot maximizing number of licensees and royalty
under this regime. The prot of licensor s (s = 1; :::; ) is
R(rs; r s) = k:rs:q(k; rs; r s);
where rs denotes the royalty charged by licensor s, r s =
P
j 6=s rj , and q(k;R)
is given by (3). From (3) and (4) we deduce that n manufacturers will enter if
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R  a c, and none otherwise. Consequently licensor s maximizes the following
expression:
R(rs; r s) =
8>><>>:
rs:n:
a  c  rs   r s
2 + (n  1) if rs  a  c  r s
0 otherwise.
It can easily be veried that individual royalties charged by patent owners
are strategic substitutes. Proposition 1 describes the symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 1: In a royalty regime, there is a unique symmetric equilibrium
in which n manufacturers enter. The individual royalties and licensing prots
are then given by:
rR =
a  c
1 + 
R =
n
2 + (n  1)

a  c
1 + 
2
:
Proof: Obvious and thus omitted.
The number of licensors decreases along with individual royalties and prots.
Lemma 1 below displays the e¤ect of  on cumulative royalties (RR = rR) and
licensing prots (R).
Lemma 1: In a royalty regime, the cumulative royalty paid by manufac-
turers (i.e. rR) is increasing in , while the cumulative prot of licensors is
decreasing in .
Proof: Obvious and thus omitted.
This result captures the double marginalization problem that arises when
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complementary patents are licensed separately (Shapiro, 2001). Each licensor
charges a mark-up without taking into account that a mark-up reduces the
demand for other licensors. At the equilibrium, cumulative royalties are too high
and reducing them would increase the total licensing prots. In this context, a
merger between the patent owners or, which may be more realistic, the creation
of a patent pool, increases the patent ownersprots.
3.2 Fixed-fee regime
Let
 
kF ; lF1 ; :::; l
F


denote the prot-maximizing number of licensees and xed
fees under this regime. Under free entry xed fees permit full extraction of
the rmsprot. Note that the cumulative fee L =
P
s=1;:::; ls determines the
number kF of competing manufacturers at equilibrium. All n rms will enter if
L  (n; 0). For any L > (n; 0) there is a unique kF < n such that (2) holds
and we have 
 
kF ; 0

= L.
Proposition 2: There exists a symmetric equilibrium characterized as fol-
lows:
kF =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
n for   2(2 1)n+1 ;
2 
(2 1) for  2
i
2
(2 1)n+1 ;
1

h
;
1 for   1 ;
and
lF =
1

(kF ; 0):
Proof: See Appendix.
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Before discussing these results, it is useful to consider the case in which there
is only one patent owner described in the corollary below.
Corollary 1: For the case  = 1 we have
kF =
8>><>>:
n for   2n+1 ;
2 
 for  2
i
2
n+1 ; 1
i
:
Proof: Set  = 1 in the proof of Proposition 2.
When products are homogenous ( = 1) the monopoly is clearly the prot-
maximizing market structure and the licensor allows only one entrant. As prod-
ucts become more di¤erentiated (
2
n+ 1
<  < 1), the licensors incentive to
sell more than one licence is due to the additional licensing prots generated by
product variety and kF is thus increasing in the degree of di¤erentiation (1=).
The equilibrium number of licensees results from a trade-o¤ between product
variety and price competition. Any increase of the fee entails an increase in the
prot per licensee, but also a decrease in the number of entrants, and thus less
variety. As product di¤erentiation increases, the second e¤ect becomes more
important and more licenses are issued. Beyond a certain threshold of product
di¤erentiation (  2= (n+ 1)), it is protable to set k = n.
We can now turn again to Proposition 2, and examine specically the case
 > 1. We can still observe the equilibria identied with a unique licensor,
but the number of patent owners now modies both the intervals over which
the equilibria take place and the number of entrants in the second equilibrium.
When  is such that we have 1 < kF < n entrants in equilibrium, the number
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of entrants is decreasing in the number of licensors. Indeed, the cumulative fees
increase with , which denotes a coordination failure, and induces fewer entrants
for a given . While kF = 1 was only optimal for  = 1 when we had only
one license holder, it now occurs for a wider range of product di¤erentiation.
In other words, entry is now restricted to one licensee only when products are
weakly di¤erentiated, and products need to be more di¤erentiated for all n
candidates to be allowed into the market.
Lemma 2: Let F =
P
s=1;:::; l

s denote the cumulative licensing prot
in a xed-fee regime:
1-For   2(2 1)n+1 , and  2
h
1
 ; 1
i
, the cumulative licensing prot F
does not depend on .
2-For  2
h
2
(2 1)n+1 ;
1

i
, the cumulative licensing prot F is decreasing
in .
Proof: Obvious and thus omitted.
Lemma 2 states that the total licensing revenue is non-increasing with respect
to the number of patent owners. More precisely, adding patent owners reduces
the total licensing revenue when it e¤ectively deters entry. When di¤erentiation
is very strong so that n licenses are granted, increasing  will not a¤ect licensing
revenues until the threshold  = 2(2 1)n+1 is reached. Finally, when there is
only one licensee left, increasing the sum of xed fees would kill the market so
that patent owners would have to adjust their fees and their total revenue would
remain constant.
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3.3 Two-part tari¤
Let
 
kT ; lT1 ; :::; l
T
 ; r
T

denote the prot-maximizing number of licensees, xed
fees and royalty under this regime. A two-part tari¤ regime allows the licensors
to control the number of manufacturers through the xed fee, and the product
prices through the royalties.
Proposition 3: The following xed fee and royalty form the unique sym-
metric Nash equilibrium.
1- For all   1 we have
rT =
(n  1) (a  c)
2 + (n  1)(+ 1) and l
T =
1


a  c
2 + (n  1)(+ 1)
2
:
and kT = n:
2-For  2
i
1
 ; 1
i
the optimal royalty level is zero and the licensors use a
xed-fee regime with lT =
(a  c)2
4
and kT = 1.
Proof: See Appendix.
As with the xed-fee license, it is useful to consider rst the case of a unique
patent owner.
Corollary 2: Two-part tari¤ with a single licensor.
A single licensor systematically sells n licenses and sets
rT =
(n  1) (a  c)
2 + 2(n  1) and l
T =

a  c
2 + 2(n  1)
2
:
Proof: Set X = 1 in the results of Proposition 3.
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It is interesting to note that when products are homogenous ( = 1), the
royalty and xed fee are such that the licensor extracts
T =
(a  c)2
4
which is equal to the monopoly rents. The two-part tari¤ makes it possible to
derive the maximum benet of product variety while avoiding rent dissipation
through competition between licensees. To do so, the licensor uses the royalty
to monitor competitive prices, and the xed-fee license to extract all market
prots. It can easily be veried that the per-unit royalty then decreases in
the degree of product di¤erentiation (since di¤erentiation increasingly mitigates
price competition) while the xed-fee license increases in parallel (because the
market prot per licensee increases with di¤erentiation).
We now analyze what happens when  > 1. As Lemma 3 states, under two-
part tari¤ a licensors revenue is either monotonically increasing or decreasing
in k.
Lemma 3: In an equilibrium with a positive royalty (r > 0) and a positive
xed fee (l > 0) the total licensing prot T increases with k if   1

and
decreases otherwise.
Proof: See Appendix.
The threshold  = 1= identied in Lemma 3 corresponds exactly to the
threshold where the licensing equilibrium shifts from full entry to k = 1 in
Proposition 3. When they are too numerous, patent owners fail to coordinate
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and thus extract less prots from product variety. They are then better o¤
limiting entry to one licensee and sharing the resulting monopoly prot. Since
this shift proceeds from individual trade-o¤s between the benet of variety and
the cost coordination failure, the threshold of  above which it takes place is
higher the more di¤erentiated the products.
Lemma 4: The cumulative licensing prot with two-part tari¤ is given by:
T =
n(a  c)2 (1 + (n  1))
[2 + (n  1)(+ 1)]2 ;
where   1 : It is thus decreasing in .
Proof: Obvious and thus omitted.
4 Comparing the di¤erent regimes
Having characterized the equilibria and coordination issues with each of the
licensing regimes, we now compare total licensing revenues of patent owners
within these regimes. For clarity, we rst consider the case of a single patent
owner, and then extend the analysis to multiple patent owners.
4.1 Monopolistic license ownership.
Assume that  = 1, meaning either that there is a single patent owner or that
all patent owners form a patent pool. Before considering the two-part tari¤,
we rst compare the xed-fee and royalty regimes. We establish in Proposition
4 that each regime can maximize the total licensing revenue depending on the
17
level of product di¤erentiation.
Proposition 4: The royalty regime leads to higher prots than the xed-fee
regime provided n  6 and  2 [; ], where
 =
n+ 1 pn2 + 1  6n
2n
and  =
n+ 1 +
p
n2 + 1  6n
2n
For any other combinations of  and n the xed-fee regime dominates the roy-
alty regime.
Proof: See Appendix.
When the standard either supports nearly independent products ( < ) or
appeals to very few users (n low), a xed-fee license granted to all is superior to
a royalty-based license because it makes it possible to extract all of the (close
to) monopoly prots from each licensee9 . Aside from these two situations, the
xed-fee regime does not systematically maximize prots. For any given k sold
licenses, the licensing revenue decreases with price competition as the product
become more homogeneous (! 1). Reducing the number of licensees through
xed-fees is a way to mitigate price competition, but it prevents the licensor
from deriving a prot from product variety when di¤erentiation is substantial.
By contrast, the royalty regime triggers full entry, but enables the licensor to
mitigate price competition through the impact of royalties on marginal produc-
tion costs. When products are di¤erentiated yet not independent ( 2 [; ]),
9Note that as ! 1, we nd that the xed fee is superior because the licensor limits entry
to only one rm. This corresponds to the ndings of Kamien and Tauman (1986).
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a royalty is the best way to extract a licensing revenue from product variety
provided potential entrants are numerous (n  6). Finally, if we consider the
two-part tari¤, the following result is evident. Recall that with  = 1; the two-
part tari¤ regime is well dened (i.e.l > 0 and r > 0) and has k = n for all
 2 [0; 1].
Lemma 5: The two-part tari¤ regime dominates both the xed-fee and the
royalty regimes
Proof: obvious and thus omitted.
The two-part tari¤ regime allows the licensor to combine the advantages of
both the xed-fee and royalty regimes. The licensor uses royalties to neutralize
price competition between licensees, and sets the xed-fee so as to extract the
full industry prots.
4.2 Decentralized licensing.
We have seen that multiple licensors generate coordination failures resulting in
prot losses for each of the three regimes. The cumulative licensing prots are
compared in Proposition 5 below.
Proposition 5:
1-For any  2
h
0; 2(2 1)n+1
i
, we have T > F > R.
2-For any  2
i
2
(2 1)n+1 ;
1

i
the two-part tari¤ dominates both the xed-
fee and royalty regimes. Moreover, there exists a unique n1(; ) such that
R > F if and only if n > n1(; ).
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3-Consider any  2
i
1
 ; 1
i
. Over that interval only the xed-fee and the
royalty regimes are relevant. We show that
(i) for  2
i
1
 ;
4
(1+)2
h
there exists a unique n2(; ) such that R > F
if and only if n > n2(; ).
(ii) for  2
h
4
(1+)2 ; 1
i
we have R < F :
Proof: See Appendix.
Table 1 below summarizes which is the overall prot-maximizing regime.
 Prot maximizing regime (  2)h
0; 1
i
Two-part tari¤ (kT = n)
h
1
 ;
4
(1+)2
i 8>><>>:
Fixed fee (kF = 1) if n < n2
Royalty (kR = n) if n > n2h
4
(1+)2 ; 1
i
Fixed fee (kF = 1).
Table 1.
For a given number of patent owners  > 1, the prot maximizing licensing
scheme varies depending on the degree of product di¤erentiation () and on the
number of potential entrants (n). The two-part tari¤ regime dominates both the
xed-fee and royalty regimes, because this regime helps to control coordination
issues and limits the losses they generate.
A pure xed-fee regime dominates the royalty regime for low levels of dif-
ferentiation ( > 4(1 + ) 2) by inducing a monopolistic market structure
downstream and avoiding the price distortions induced by positive royalties.
Similarly, this regime makes it possible to extract close to monopoly rents when
products are su¢ ciently di¤erentiated ( < 2(2 1)n+1 ). In this particular case,
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where the latter regime raises revenue by inducing more product varieties, the
xed-fee regime performs better than the royalty regime but not as well as a
two-part tari¤ regime.
For intermediate values of product di¤erentiation, product variety can be-
come an important source of prots. Therefore, when n is large enough (n > n2
or n > n1 depending on whether  is greater or less than 1 ), the royalty regime
performs better than the xed-fee regime.
5 Total surplus
In this section we focus on social welfare by introducing consumer welfare into
the analysis. Note here that patent owners are legally entitled to maximize
their prots, since this maximizes their incentives to innovate. Therefore, they
should be allowed to select the licensing scheme accordingly. It is nevertheless
of interest to study how their choice may a¤ect static social welfare. We rst
highlight the main trade-o¤ underlying the social surplus problem, and then use
simulations to compare the licensing regime.
5.1 Comparing product prices and variety
There is no clear hierarchy between the three licensing regimes as regards con-
sumerswelfare. As stated in Proposition 6, product prices on the one hand,
and product variety on the other, are ranked strictly inversely.
Proposition 6: Prices and variety on the product market are ranked such
21
that
kF  kT  kR
pF  pT < pR
Proof: See Appendix.
Observe rst that product variety is always lower with xed-fee regimes than
with two-part tari¤s, and with two-part tari¤s than with royalties. This is not
surprising since prot maximization with xed fees is entirely based on entry
limitation, which is only partly the case with two-part tari¤ and not at all with
pure royalties. The ranking of prices is identical. This would be straightforward
under an equal number of licensees, for royalties increase the cost and thus the
price. Yet Proposition 6 extends this intuition to the seemingly more ambiguous
cases where the number of competitors is restricted below n due to a positive
xed fee.
5.2 Welfare comparison
Given that the three regimes have contrasting advantages in terms of products,
prices and variety, ranking them requires a full analysis of social surplus. Such
analysis is complex and makes it more di¢ cult to obtain clear results. We
therefore limit our analysis to the numeric simulations with  = 1 and  = 2,
and show that welfare comparison is then consistent with our results on prot
comparison.
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To introduce the consumerssurplus in the welfare analysis, we know from
Vives (1999) that the total surplus in an economy with di¤erentiated items with
linear costs and linear demand can be written as
TSr = U (qr1; :::; q
r
kr ) 
P
i=1;:::kr
cqri
where r stands for the regime under consideration (r = F;R; T ) and U(:) is
given by (1). Given that output is symmetric, we can rewrite the total surplus
as:
U(q; k) = (a  c) kq   1
2
kq2 [1 + (k   1)]
The question we intend to answer is which regime maximizes total surplus.
Figure 1 (below) displays the total surpluses as a function of  under the
two-part tari¤ and the xed-fee regimes when there is only one licensor ( = 1).
Figure 1: TSF and TST with  = 1.
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For  = 1, the total surplus is maximized using the xed-fee regime for
 2
i
0; 5n+2
h
and the two-part tari¤ for  2
h
5
n+2 ; 1
i
. The royalty regime is
sub-optimal as it is always dominated by the two-part tari¤ regime. This result
is very close to what we obtain in Proposition 5 and Lemma 4.
As a general rule, two-part tari¤ is the most appropriate way to combine
the benets of product variety and low prices when the number of potential
entrants is large.10 It allows full entry of di¤erentiated rms while avoiding
price distortions, which also maximizes licensing prots and consumer surplus.
This eventually changes as product di¤erentiation increases and/or the number
of potential entrants is low. In that case, the xed-fee regime is a better way to
obtain lower prices with a limited number of licensees.
We consider now the case   2. Proposition 7 gives a comparison of all the
di¤erent regimes in terms of the surplus generated.
Proposition 7. For any   2, we establish the following:
(i) The two-part tari¤ regime leads to a higher total surplus than the royalty
regime.
(ii) There exists a unique TF 2
h
2
(2 1)n+1 ;
1

i
such that the xed -fee
regime maximizes the total surplus for all  2 0; TF .
(iii) For  2
h
TF ; 1
i
the two-part tari¤ regime maximizes the total surplus.
(iv) Finally, there exists n the unique solution to (15) in Appendix, such
that the xed-fee regime is optimal for all  2
h
1
 ; 1
i
if n  n. And if n > n
10The greater the number of products downstream, the wider the range of  for which the
two-part tari¤ regime maximizes the total surplus.
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there exists a unique bRF 2 h 1 ; 1i such that the royalty regime is optimal overh
1
 ; bRF i while the xed-fee regime dominates for any  2 hbRF ; 1i.
Proof: See Appendix.
Figures 2 and 3 below illustrates Proposition 7.
Figure 2: TSF ; TST and TSR for any  > 1 and n  n.
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Figure 3: TSF ; TST and TSR for any  > 1 and n > n.
As with prot comparison, we can observe that any regime may maximize
total surplus in the presence of a coordination failure by the licensors. The
conditions for dominance of each regime are very similar to those displayed in
Proposition 5. For any  2
h
0; 1
i
the reason a regime is optimal is the same as
that for the case of  = 1. For  > 1 , the only relevant regimes are the xed-
fee and the royalty regimes. Therefore consumers either face a monopolistic
supplier and no price distortion or n suppliers (and thus n varieties) and double
marginalization. As we have seen, even when products are close substitutes
( = 1) the monopolistic price with no royalty is lower than the price prevailing
with n entrants and a royalty regime.
Proposition 7 tells us that allowing for more varieties is best only when the
number of potential varieties (n) is large enough and products are su¢ ciently
di¤erentiated. More generally, it is trivial to prove that as n increases, the
intervals
h
TF ; 1
i
and
h
1
 ; bRF i become wider, since more varieties increases
the total surplus under the royalty and two-part tari¤ regimes.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have explored the licensing of complementary patents to man-
ufacturers entering a new market for standard-compliant products. It is well
known that the separate licensing of such patents entails a coordination failure
namely double marginalizationwhen licensors set per-unit royalties in a decen-
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tralized fashion. Considering the case of licensing regimes based on xed-fees or
two-part tari¤s, we have characterized the licensing strategies of the patent own-
ers depending on the degree of product di¤erentiation, the number of potential
entrants, and the number of patent owners. We have in particular established
that each regime entails specic types of coordination failures when licensors are
numerous and have compared the respective performances of the three regimes.
Each regime entails specic advantages for owners of patents that read on
a standard. When discrimination is ruled out, xed fees allow the control of
licensee numbers by establishing, and raising if necessary, a xed cost of entry
in the market for standard compliant products. Moreover, they allow a full
extraction of the industry prots. However, they cannot prevent licensees from
competing away part of their prots. By contrast, per-unit royalties can neither
limit entry nor extract full industry prots, but they do allow the licensor to
raise marginal costs, thereby mitigating price competition. We have shown
that per-unit royalties are therefore preferable for the licensors in specic cases
where a large number of licensees would manufacture su¢ ciently di¤erentiated
products, since product variety allows greater prot. Since the two-part tari¤
regime combines both royalties and xed-fees, when there is only one licensor
this regime is better than the two other regimes in terms of licensing prots.
The single licensor can a¤ord to allow full entry, thereby maximizing variety,
while using royalties to control prices and, nally, xed fees to extract all prots.
As the number of licensors increases we reach the following results. Like
pure royalties, the xed-fee and two-part tari¤ regimes generate a coordina-
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tion failure, although of a di¤erent type. Under the xed-fee regime, licensors
tend to demand excessive fees, the stacking of which results in an ine¢ ciently
small number of licensees. Two-part tari¤s raise the same problem of xed-fee
stacking when products are weakly di¤erentiated. As products become more
di¤erentiated, the licensing equilibrium eventually changes, which modies the
nature of the coordination failure. In that case all candidates are granted a
license, but the stacking of royalties now induces the same type of ine¢ ciency
as in a pure royalty regime. In any case, total licensing prot decreases as the
number of patent owners increases.
Comparing the three regimes shows that each of them may maximize the
total licensing revenue when several patents must be licensed. The xed-fee
regime dominates when products are weakly di¤erentiated, since there is then
no advantage in letting a large number of licensees enter the market. When
products are strongly di¤erentiated, two-part tari¤ is the best regime, provided
the number of potential entrants is su¢ ciently large. It allows full entry, thereby
maximizing variety, while inducing fewer price distortions than pure royalties.
Finally, pure royalty may dominate when products are mildly di¤erentiated and
potentially numerous. Licensors would then indeed opt for a xed-fee regime
rather than two-part tari¤, thereby precluding entry and losing the benet of
product variety. A welfare comparison including patent owners and consumers
does not signicantly change these results. This suggests that letting the patent
ownerschoose a particular licensing regime is socially acceptable.
This analysis has limitations that would be worth addressing in follow-up
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research. A rst possible extension concerns the nature of the licensed innova-
tion. By focusing on a standard whose adoption allows entry into a new market,
we have implicitly likened it to a drastic innovation. Although this assumption
is quite reasonable, it could be relaxed by considering an innovation that is not
drastic, to have a better understanding, for instance, of the transition between
two generations of standards. While most debates on the decentralized licensing
of complementary patents focus on cooperative industry standards, the analysis
could be extended to more general cases where licensors are not constrained by
any collective rule. Such an analysis would make it possible to account for the
possibility that patent owners individually choose their licensing scheme, as well
as for possible competition between some patent owners.
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Appendix
Proof of proposition 2.
Let L =
X
s=1
ls denote the sum of xed-fees. Under free entry, the number of
rms participating in the downstream market is given by:
k (L) =
8>>>>>>>>>><>>>>>>>>>>:
0 if L >
 
a c
2
2
1 if L =
 
a c
2
2
a c (2 )pL

p
L
if L 2
 
a c
2
2
;

a c
2+(n 1)
2
n if L 
h
a c
2+(n 1)
i2
We consider successively the corner solutions and then the interior solution.
 Corner solution 1: k (L) = 1:
Assume that patent owners 2,3,.., set l = 1(1; 0) =
1

 
a c
2
2
and let us
examine when it is optimal for patent owner 1 to set the same xed-fee. In
that case L 1 =
X
s=2
ls =
 1
 (1; 0). Taking L 1 as given patent holder
1 maximizes
Maxk (k)
(k) = k [(k; 0)  L 1]
We have
d
dk
= (k; 0)  L 1 + kd
dk
, d
dk
=

a  c
2 + (k   1)
2 
1  2k
2 + (k   1)

    1


a  c
2
2
:
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Evaluating the above at k = 1 we get:
d
dk

k=1
=
(a  c)2
4

1

  

:
It can be veried that(k) is concave. Thus for   1 the above derivative
is negative and it establishes that (k) reaches a maximum at k = 1
meaning that patent holder 1 has no incentive to increase entry and sets
l1 =
1
(1; 0). Given that the argument would be perfectly symmetric for
patent holder 2,3,... and , we have established that setting L =
 
a c
2
2
and selling k = 1 license forms a Nash equilibrium for any   1 .
 Corner solution 2: k (L) = n:
Assume that patent owners 2,3,.., set l = 1(n; 0) =
1

h
a c
2+(n 1)
i2
and
let us examine when it is optimal for patent owner 1 to set the same xed-
fee. In that case we have L 1 =  1 (n; 0). At L = L 1, n rms enter.
Patent holder 1 will obviously set l1  (n; 0)

as anything below would
only lower her prot. Patent holder 1 maximizes
Maxk (k)
(k) = k [(k; 0)  L 1]
We have
d
dk
= (k; 0)  L 1 + kd
dk
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, d
dk
=

a  c
2 + (k   1)
2 
1  2k
2 + (k   1)

    1


a  c
2 + (n  1)
2
:
Evaluating the above at k = n we have:
d
dk

k=n
=
(a  c)2
 (2 + (n  1))3 [2  (1 + n(2  1))] :
The above derivative is positive for any   2(2 1)n+1 . Therefore, since
(k) is concave, it establishes that (k) reaches a maximum at k = n for
such values of . Given that the argument would be perfectly symmetric
for patent holder 2,3,... and , we have established that setting L =h
a c
2+(n 1)
i2
and selling k = n licenses forms a Nash equilibrium for any
  2(2 1)n+1 :
 Interior solution.
Assume that there exists an equilibrium such that L belongs to 
a c
2
2
;

a c
2+(n 1)
2
. Taking as given the xed-fees xed by other patent
owners, patent holder s solves:
max
ls
k (L) ls
The rst order condition (hereafter FOC) leads to:
ls =  
k (L)
k0 (L)
> 0 (5)
This clearly implies that all patent owners set the same royalty at equilibrium:
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l =   k(L)k0(L) . As there are  patent owners, we have:
L = l =   k (L)
k0 (L)
(6)
Developing and solving for L then yields:
L =

2  1
2
2
a  c
2  
2
(7)
As argued above, we have k 2 ]1; n[ if and only if

a  c
2 +  (n  1)
2
 L 

a  c
2
2
:
Using the expression of L in (7) we can write:
L 

a  c
2
2
,   1

and
L 

a  c
2 +  (n  1)
2
,   2
(2  1)n+ 1
Hence k 2 ]1; n[ if and only if
2
(2  1)n+ 1   
1

;
which forms a non-empty interval, and shows that the Nash equilibria we have
found are continuous in .
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It can be checked that the rst term on the right hand side is increasing in
 from 14 to 1. Hence the cumulative xed-fee is increasing in the number of
licensors.
Proof of proposition 3.
 First we show that the proposed xed-fees and royalties form a symmetric
Nash equilibrium.
-For all   1 we have
l =
1


a  c
2 + (n  1)(+ 1)
2
and r =
(n  1) (a  c)
2 + (n  1)(+ 1) :
and
k (l; r) = n
-For all  2
i
1
 ; 1
i
we have r = 0 and l =
(a  c)2
4
and k(L; R) = 1.
Assume ( 1) patent owners apply the xed-fee an royalty described above.
The remaining patent owner solves11
Maxk;rss(k; rs)
where s(k; rs) = k [ls + rsq(rs; k)]
with
ls = max
(
a  c  rs  R s
2 + (k   1)
2
  F (x); 0
)
11Maximizing with respect to l or k leads to the same outcome.
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where
R s =
8>><>>:
( 1)(n 1)(a c)
2+(n 1)(+1) if   1 ;
0 otherwise,
and
F (x) =
  1


a  c
2 + (x  1) (1 + )
2
with x = n for all   1 and x = 1 for  > 1 : (Note that the above is
independent of k and rs. However because it is multiplied by k it will appear
in the FOC.)
The FOC with respect to rs leads to
a  c  rs  R s = rs + 2q(rs; R s; k)
Substituting in k and R s and rs = r
 we nd that the above is indeed equal
to zero. Concavity can be easily checked. Thus the royalty r forms a Nash
equilibrium.
We now turn to the optimal value for k. Di¤erentiating the prot with
respect to k leads to
@s
@k
= q2(k; rs; R

 s)  F (x)  2kq2(k; rs; R s)
1
2 + (k   1)
+rsq(k; rs; R

 s) 
krs
2 + (k   1)q(k; rs; R

 s)
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Moreover we have12
@2s
@k2
=   2q
2
(2 + (k   1))2

k(1  ) + (2  )2 < 0:
Thus the prot function is concave in k.
It is a best response for the remaining rm to set l = l and thus allow the
entry of n rms if and only if
@s
@k

k=n
 0:
We have
@s
@k

k=n
=

(a  c)
2 + (n  1)(1 + )
2 
1

  

;
therefore @s@k

k=n
 0 when   1 .
It is a best response for the remaining rm to set l = l (and r = 0) and
thus allow the entry of 1 rm if and only if
@s
@k

k=1
 0:
We have
@s
@k

k=1
=
(a  c)2
4

1

  

;
therefore @s@k

k=1
 0 when  > 1 .
 Second we demonstrate how we found the values for l and r.
12After inserting r = (k   1)q (see below).
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Taking as given the xed-fee and royalty set by other patent owners, li-
censor s solves
Maxls;rsk [ls + rsq(rs; k)]
subject to
k = min
nbk; no with (bk; r) = P
j=1;:::;
lj :
For any given pairs (rj ; lj)j=1;:::; the variable bk is uniquely dened. Let
R = (r1; ::::; r) and L = (l1; ::::; l). The Lagrangian associated with this
maximization problem is given by
L(k; r) = k(R;L) [ls + rsq(R; k(R;L))]  s [k(R;L)  n] :
The reaction functions are determined as follows:
-The derivative with respect to rs, @L@rs , must equal zero:
@k
@rs
[ls + rsq] + k

q + rs

@q
@k
@k
@rs
+
@q
@rs

= s
@k
@rs
(8)
Note that  = q2 thus the xed-fees are such that
q2(k(R;L); R)  L = 0: (9)
Di¤erentiating the above with respect to rs leads to
2q

@q
@k
@k
@rs
+
@q
@rs

= 0
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therefore the expression

@q
@k
@k
@rs
+
@q
@rs

in (8) is equal to 0.
Finally
@k
@rs
=  
@q
@rs
@q
@k
=   1
q
after simplications. Thus (8) reads
ls + rsq   kq2 = s: (10)
-The derivative with respect to ls, @L@ls , must equal zero:
@k
@ls
[ls + rsq] + k

1 + rs
@q
@k
@k
@ls

= s
@k
@ls
(11)
Using (9) we have
@q
@k
@k
@ls
=
1
2q
:
Moreover
@k
@ls
=   (2 + (k   1))
2q2
:
Plugging the above in (11) we get
s = ls + rsq   kq 2q + rs
2 + (k   1) :
Whether or not s = 0 we must always have
kq2 = kq
2q + rs
2 + (k   1) :
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From there we obtain that
rs = (k   1)q(R; k):
Solving the above for r shows that in a symmetric equilibrium we necessarily
have
rT = (k   1) a  c  r
T
2 + (k   1)
which is the value of rT in proposition 3.
Consider now (10). It can be re-written as
ls + r
T q(RT ; k)  kq2(RT ; k)  s = 0:
In a symmetric equilibrium we have lT = q2(RT ; k) due to the full extraction
of the surplus. Using this and the value for rT the above re-writes as
a  c
2 +  (k   1) (+ 1) [1  ]  s = 0:
We must have s  0 at the solution. Thus either
1   > 0 and thus s 6= 0 so that k = n at the solution.
Or else 1    < 0 and thus s = 0 so that k < n. In this case note that the
function we maximize is monotone in l and reaches a maximum for l such that
k = 1.
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Proof of Lemma 3
Assume that there exist an equilibrium with a positive royalty (r) and a
positive xed fee (l) such that k 2 ]1; n[ rms enter. If such an equilibrium
exists then r and k solve
Max
r;k
k [l(k) + rq(r; k)]
where,
l(k) + (  1)l = (k; r) = q2(k; r):
Taking the rst order conditions with respect to r shows that setting
r =
(k   1)(a  c)
2 + (k   1)(1 + )
is optimal. Note that this means that r = 0 is indeed optimal for the specic
case k = 1. When di¤erentiating with respect to k we get
@T
@k
= l(k) + rq(k; r) + k
@q
@k
[2q(k; r) + r] :
In equilibrium we have l(k) = q2(k; r), r = (k   1)q(k; r) and
@q
@k
=   
2 + (k   1)q(k
; r):
Therefore the derivative of the licensors prot with respect to k can be re-
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written as
@T
@k
= q2(k; r)

1

  

:
Therefore
@T
@k
 0 if and only if   1

.
Proof of Proposition 4
In equilibrium, we have:
F = kF

(a  c)
(2 + (k   1))
2
;
where kF = min

2  

; n

, and
R =
1
4
n
(a  c)2
(2 + (n  1)) :
When   2
n+ 1
, we have kF = n and for all such cases
F > R ,  < 2
n  1 ;
which is systematically true.
When  >
2
n+ 1
, we have kF =
2  

and for all such cases
F > R , n < 2  
(1  ) :
The above holds provided n  6 and  2 [; ] as stated in proposition 4.
Proof of proposition 5
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Point 1 is obvious. Regarding point 2: showing that two-part tari¤ yields
a greater income than the other 2 regimes is obvious. As for the comparison
between the xed-fee and the royalty regimes, we have F  R if and only
if
(2  1) (1 + ) (2 + (n  1)) > 43(2  )n: (12)
Figure 4 (below) represents the left and right hand sides of the inequality above,
with n on the horizontal axis.
Figure 4: Representing the left and right had sides of (12).
For any  2
i
2
(2 1)n+1 ;
1

i
; we have
4(2  )3 < 2(2  1) (1 + )2 :
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Moreover, for any  2
i
2
(2 1)n+1 ;
1

i
;
 (2  1) (1 + ) < 4(2  )3:
Therefore, as a functions of n, the right hand side of inequality (12) is lower
than the left hand side but it is also steeper. Thus, the two curves cross at most
once for n su¢ ciently large.
Finally, we turn to point 3. We have F  R if and only if
(2 + (n  1)) (1 + )2 > 4n: (13)
Figure 5 (below) represents the left and right hand sides of the inequality above,
with n on the horizontal axis.
Figure 5: Illustrating (13).
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We have
2 (1 + )
2
> 4:
Moreover, the slopes of the left and right hand side functions of n are equal if
and only if
 =
4
(1 + )2
, which belongs to

1

; 1

:
If   4(1+)2 the two curves never cross. If  < 4(1+)2 there exists a unique n2
such that F  R if and only if n > n2.
Proof of proposition 6
The comparison of kR; kF and kT is obvious. To compare the prices down-
stream, note that the price cost margins are given by the following expressions:
pF   c = a  c
2 +  (kF   1) ;
pR   c =

a  c
1 + 

1 + 2+ (n  1)
2 +  (n  1) ;
and
pT   c = (a  c) (1 + (n  1))
2 + (n  1)(1 + ) where  
1

:
Proof of Proposition 7
Note that the total surplus is concave in q and maximizes at q =
a  c
1 + (k   1) .
Due to concavity, for a given k, the total surplus increases in q for and q < q:
 Consider any   2
(2  1)n+ 1 .
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All regimes have k = n. We have
qR =

1
1 + 

a  c
2 + (n  1)

;
qF =
(a  c)
2 +  (n  1)
and
qT =
a  c
2 +  (n  1) (1 + ) :
It is trivial to show that qR < qT < qF < q. Given that surplus increases
in q for any q < q, we have TSR < TST < TSF .
 Consider any  > 1 . Over that interval the only two relevant regimes are
the xed fee regime and the royalty regime. We have
TSF =
3
8
(a  c)2;
and
TSR =
n [3 + 4+  (n  1) (1 + 2)]
2 (1 + )
2
(2 +  (n  1))2 (a  c)
2: (14)
Note that TSR is decreasing in  and increasing in n for any given .
Note also that TSF is constant in both  and n. We have TSR > TSF
at  =
1

if and only if n > n which solves
4n [ (3 + 4) + (n  1) (1 + 2)] = 3 (1 + )2 [2  1 + n]2 : (15)
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Since Lim
n!+1TS
R =
(1 + 2) (a  c)2
2(1 + )2
, we have that for any
4 (1 + 2)
3 (1 + )
2 <
 < 1 : TSF > TSR.
Therefore for any n  n we have TSR < TSF for all  > 1 since TSR
decreases in  and is below TSF at  =
1

. And for n > n there exists
a unique bRF 2 " 1

;
4 (1 + 2)
3 (1 + )
2
#
such that TSR  TSF if and only if
 2
h
1
 ; bRF i since TSR decreases in  but is above TSF at  = 1 and
below TSF at  =
4 (1 + 2)
3 (1 + )
2 .
 Finally, let us consider any  2

2
(2  1)n+ 1 ;
1


.
The comparison of the two-part tari¤ and the royalty regime leads to
TST > TSR since we still have kR = kT = n and qR < qT < q.
Comparing the two-part tari¤ regime with the xed fee regime:
Over the interval considered, we have
TSF =
[2 (3  )  1]
82(2  ) (a  c)
2; (16)
and
TST =
n
2
[3 +  (n  1) (1 + 2)]
[2 +  (n  1) (1 + )]2 (a  c)
2: (17)
Both total surpluses are decreasing in . We know that TSF > TST at
 =
2
(2  1)n+ 1 and one can easily show that TS
F < TST at  =
1

.13
Given that the functions TSF and TST are continuous in , it must be
13 Indeed TST > TSF at  = 1

is equivalent to (  1) [(5n+ 3)+ 3(n  1)] > 0 which
is always true.
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that TSF and TST cross at least once, and, if more than once, they should
cross an odd number of times. We now prove that they can only cross once.
Setting TST = TSF is equivalent to requiring14
F () = 0; (18)
where
F () = 4 (6  1) + 33 + 22 + 1;
with
3 = 2 (n  1)
h
n
 
32   1+ (1 + )2i ;
2 = (6  1) (n  1)2 (1 + )2   8 (n  1) (1 + )
+12n2   82n (n  1) (1 + 2) ;
and
1 = 4 (n  1) (5  1)  8 (1 + 3) :
The equation (18) admits 3 real solutions. We know that one is necessarily
between

2
(2  1)n+ 1 ;
1


since TSF and TST cross at least once over
that interval. We show that the other 2 solutions are outside this interval.
Since 3 > 0, lim!+1 F () = +1. Since we know that F ( 1 ) < 0, there
exists 0 > 1 such that F (
0) = 0. Since 3 > 0, lim! 1 F () =  1.
14And we have TST > TSF , F () < 0.
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However since F (0) > 0, there exists 00 < 0 such that F (00) = 0. Thus
there exists a unique TF 2

2
(2  1)n+ 1 ;
1


such that TSF = TST
and we have TST > TSF for any  2

TF ;
1


.
Comparing the royalty regime with the xed fee regime:
TSR is given by (14) and TSF is given by (16). Both total surpluses
are decreasing in . We have TSF > TSR at  =
2
(2  1)n+ 1 . We
have TSF < TSR at  =
1

if and only if n > n, where n solves (15).
Following an argument similar to the one above we establish that if TSR
and TSF cross over the interval considered for , then they can only cross
once.
Setting TST = TSF is equivalent to requiring15
G() = 0; (19)
where
G() = 4 (6  1) (1 + )2 + 33 + 22 + 1;
with
3 = 3;
2 = (6  1) (n  1)2 (1 + )2   8 (n  1) (1 + )2
 82n (n  1) (1 + 2) + 42 (3 + 4)n;
15And we have TSR > TSF , G() < 0.
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and
1 = 4 (n  1) (6  1) (1 + )2   8 (1 + )2   82 (3 + 4)n:
The equation (19) admits 3 real solutions. We show that at least 2 are
outside the interval

2
(2  1)n+ 1 ;
1


.
Since 3 > 0, lim! 1G() =  1. However since G(0) > 0, there
exists  < 0 such that G() = 0. For any n > n we have G

1


<
0 and since lim!+1G() = +1.there exists one  > 1 such that
G() = 0. This proves that for any n > n there exists a unique RF 2
2
(2  1)n+ 1 ;
1


such that TSF = TSR and we have TSR > TSF
for any  2

RF ;
1


. Note that at n = n we have RF =
1

and
TSF > TSR for any  2

2
(2  1)n+ 1 ;
1


. As n decreases below n,
TSR decreases and therefore it will necessarily be lower than TSF for all
 2

2
(2  1)n+ 1 ;
1


.
Conclusion: Provided n  n, there exists a unique
RF 2

2
(2  1)n+ 1 ;
1


such that TSF = TSR and we have TSR >
TSF for any  2

RF ;
1


. For any n < n, we have TSF > TSR for
the interval considered.
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